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Abstract

Past research on social policy in Latin America has primarily focused on how
each countries’ policies were formed, the institutional framework that bred the
policies, or the economic constraints that necessitated certain reforms. Little
work has been done to examine the effects those policies have had on the
populace. This thesis attempts to determine if there is a relationship between
social spending and satisfaction with democracy. The research takes two forms.
First I present case studies of Brazil, Ecuador, and Venezuela. The second is an
ordered logit hierarchical linear model utilizing survey responses from the 2005
Latinobarometer survey. In total 18 countries are analyzed. Both the case studies
and the hierarchical linear model indicate that a country’s overall social spending
has very little effect on a citizen’s satisfaction with democracy. However,
citizens’ satisfaction with their access to healthcare and education are major
determinants of satisfaction with democracy in Latin America. This would
suggest that social policy does matter to Latin Americans, but that more
important than social spending is how those policies are directly impacting the
lives of the citizens.
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Chapter 1: Introduction
Much of the existing literature investigating social policy in Latin America
analyzes the conditions that have created the current social policy environments in each
country. This literature looks at the reforms implemented in the country and the economic
conditions that forced some of the reforms. Very few studies analyze how the social
policies enacted by a government are affecting its citizens. This thesis attempts to analyze
how social policy and their related programs impact the lives of citizens in Latin America
by seeking to determine if there is a relationship between the level of social spending
incurred by a country and their citizens’ satisfaction with democracy. Also of interest is
whether a citizen’s evaluation of their access to healthcare or education impacts
satisfaction with democracy. In this case, perhaps spending is not an important predictor
of satisfaction with democracy, but more significant is how well a citizen believes social
programs are impacting their life.
Unfortunately, there have been few, if any, studies examining the effects of social
welfare spending and satisfaction with democracy. Perhaps this is due to the difficulty in
analyzing the data (e.g. the effects of macro level spending on micro level attitudes), the
troubles in determining what a measure of satisfaction with democracy is really
measuring, or the lack of a formal theory that would hypothesize a relationship between
social spending and satisfaction with democracy. Whatever the reason, many authors
have discussed the importance of social spending in democracies, especially young
democracies.
Przeworski (1991) concluded that popular support for democracy will only be
won if it provides economic benefits to the citizens. He believed the political leaders in
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new democracies are able to help increase economic gains experienced within a country.
When these economic gains are then experienced by a majority of the citizens, support
for the new democracy will soon follow. He also noted that these gains are hard to
achieve when an economy is in transformation. This could be the case with the neoliberal
reforms prevalent across Latin America in the 1980s and 1990s.
Nevertheless, what if there is a missing step in Przeworski’s theory? Perhaps prior
to providing economic growth, a new democracy must create an environment that
encourages individual citizens to create economic opportunities. This could be completed
by providing adequate healthcare benefits to protect the population against sickness and
disease. It could also be done with a quality educational system that trains its citizens to
be effective laborers and professionals. It could also protect its citizens against disability
and unemployment. This is best reflected as social democratic theory. Social democracies
attempt to look at the inequalities within a nation (such as economic, social, political,
etc.) and endeavor ways in which the governmental institutions can help to alleviate those
inequalities (Pettit 1987). If so, social democratic theory advises that governments should
invest in the human resources of a country (through social programs) and posits the
economy of a nation will not experience growth when individuals are left to perish or
flourish on their own (Giddens 1998).
The impact of social democratic theory has been implied (but often not expressly
stated) in previous scholarly work on satisfaction with democracy studies. In examining
support for democracy in Africa, Bratton, Mattes and Gyimah-Boadi (2005) noted that in
new democracies “political leaders who must account to a mass electorate are inclined to
deliver welfare services, which in turn increases the stock of human capital required for
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economic advancement.” Additionally, Eastern Europeans were asked what they
associated with democracy. While the idea of freedom was the most common answer,
social welfare benefits also received more than 10% of the responses (Simon 1996).
The Latin American experience with social policy is a history of reform. The
countries all began adopting social policies at various times throughout their history;
some as early as the 1930s, and many much later than that. Some countries experienced
massive reforms (like Chile – switching from a public social security system to a
privatized system), while others are still primarily operating under their original
framework (i.e. Ecuador). Additionally, countries have had varying levels of success with
social programs. Chile’s privatization model has been imitated by several other Latin
American countries (although none have gone to a completely privatized system). Also,
Venezuela has seen positive results bringing in Cuban doctors to live in the same
neighborhoods where they are practicing medicine – usually in underserved areas.
Conversely, Brazil continues to struggle to provide adequate healthcare facilities to all
their citizens, falling short in smaller towns and rural areas.
Organization of Thesis
The remainder of the thesis is organized as follows. A review of social reforms in
Latin America is provided (Chapter 2). It offers a history of social policy in the area,
looking both at trends of the entire region as well as the evolution of social policy in three
countries (Chile, Costa Rica, and Guatemala). The following chapter (Chapter 3)
provides a brief review of the existent satisfaction with democracy literature and
describes more fully social democratic theory. It also provides the foundation and details
for the testing and analysis that will occur in Chapters 4 and 5.
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Chapter 4 provides case studies of three different countries (Brazil, Venezuela,
and Ecuador). The case studies are intended to provide more information regarding the
current social policy environment in each country, as well as the amount spent, and
compare this to levels of satisfaction with democracy. Unfortunately, due to the small
sample size, conclusions about the entire population of Latin American countries are not
feasible from this analysis. The intention is to provide more specific information about
select countries’ social policies, information that would be unable to be obtained from a
purely quantitative study.
Chapter 5 utilizes the conclusions drawn from the case study, previous
satisfaction with democracy literature, and social democratic theory to complete a
quantitative analysis of the affect of social spending on a citizen’s satisfaction with
democracy. Because of the nature of the data (i.e. both individual and country-level data),
a hierarchical linear model is utilized. Overall, approximately 17,800 survey responses
are included in the analysis, representing 18 different Latin American countries. The
thesis concludes with Chapter 6, which provides a final review and analysis of the
findings from the previous chapters.
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Chapter 2: History of Welfare Reform in Latin America
Until the late twentieth century, social welfare systems in Latin American
countries were poorly developed and most often only benefited a select few. Many
countries did however begin to reform their welfare systems. Some did so to shift the
financial burden more to the citizen due to budgetary concerns, while others did so in
response to the poor performance of parties in their countries elections (trying to please
their citizens). No matter what the reason for the reforms, Latin American countries have
seen sweeping changes to their welfare systems. While a more comprehensive description
of welfare reforms enacted in select Latin American countries follows later in this
chapter, it may be beneficial to examine the more generalized welfare environment in
Latin America.
Many scholars avoid defining the welfare state.1 Esping-Anderson provided a
very broad definition, stating it is any state that is involved in the “production and
distribution of social well-being” (1990, 1). He continued to say that welfare states can be
viewed narrowly as a system of income transfers and social services. Conversely, they
can be viewed in a broader context as a system involved with employment, wages, and
macro-level economic concerns (Esping-Anderson 1990, 1-2).
In Latin America, given Esping-Anderson’s definition, there are welfare states.
However, it could be argued that most of the countries would be considered “social
states,” or ones that provide a system of social policies, protection, and a social safety net
coupled with income redistribution policies (Filgueira 2005, 9). Costa Rica, with its

1

By defining welfare state, many scholars believe their definition would be too narrow and might omit a
country that truly should be considered a welfare state. If you are so inclined, see Titmuss (1958) and Barr
(1987) for a more detailed discussion of the difficulty in defining the welfare state.
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democratic stability and egalitarian nature of its social benefits is the closest country
Latin America has to being a social democratic welfare state (Filgueira 2005, 21).
Social Policy Prior to the Economic Crisis
Similar to the current social states across Latin American countries, systems of
social protection prior to the 1980s differed greatly. In terms of social security, only six
Latin American countries could claim a system that covered at least 60% of the
economically active population (Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Costa Rica, Cuba and
Uruguay). Six more countries had systems that covered between 30-60% of the
economically active population (Columbia, Guatemala, Mexico, Panama, Peru and
Venezuela). El Salvador, Paraguay and the Dominican Republic had policies that covered
less than 30% of the economically active population (Mesa-Lago 1994).
This classification scheme also indicates when countries enacted their social
protection policies. Other than Costa Rica, the top tier (those countries covering greater
than 60% of the population) introduced their first social security policies in the 1920s and
1930s. The middle tier introduced their first social policies in the 1940s and early 1950s,
with the exception of Guatemala. The grouping of countries covering the lowest
proportion of the population enacted their policies even later (Mesa-Lago 1994). Table
2.1 provides a summary of Mesa-Lago’s (1994) classification scheme.
After considering the structure of the social systems, there are additional
explanations why social protection remained low in Latin American countries. A major
reason was that funding for the programs was employment based. Employees and
employers were both required to pay a portion of their earnings to the government. In the
cases of self-employed individuals, most often they had to pay both the employee and
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employer share of the tax. The contributions required of the self-employed were
prohibitively expensive, thus evasion was widespread. Additionally, a large share of the
workforce was self-employed in the informal sector and was beyond the reach of the
government’s policies (Huber 2005, 78). Also, several countries lacked the enforcement
ability to require timely receipt of taxes for social programs.

Table 2.1 - Evolution of Social Security Schemes in Latin America
Pioneers
Argentina
Brazil
Chile
Cuba
Uruguay

Intermediates
Bolivia
Columbia
Costa Rica
Ecuador
Mexico
Panama
Paraguay
Peru
Venezuela

Latecomers
Dominican Republic
El Salvador
Guatemala
Haiti
Honduras
Nicaragua

Source: Mesa-Lago 1994
________________________________________________________________________
The extent of social protection afforded to the population most often included a
pension for old age and their survivors and health care benefits. Unemployment insurance
was rare, and when available, was provided only to privileged workers. Social assistance
(or aid for low-income individuals) was also poorly developed. It was most commonly
only available as a small pension to the indigent population (Huber 2005, 77).
Although the beneficiaries of the programs were relatively few, as of 1980 the
social security systems in Latin America faced considerable financial difficulties. First,
the ratio of active to inactive participants was dwindling, thus reducing the amount of
money to be paid out in benefits. Second, many companies/employers were delinquent in
7

their contributions; it was also not uncommon for employers to evade their contributions
entirely. Third, on several occasions governments failed to meet their benefit obligations.
Finally, on the expenditure side, administrative expenditures in many of the social
protection systems were extremely high as employment in these and other government
agencies were provided as a form of patronage (Huber 2005).
For the many problems encountered by the social protection systems in Latin
America, they were greatly exacerbated by the economic crisis of the 1980s. Even
without the crisis adjustments to the programs were needed. However, due to the
economic climate the changes proposed and enacted altered the nature of social policy in
the region.
The Economic Crisis and Social Policy
In Latin America’s attempt to industrialize, many countries followed a
protectionist economic policy to shield internal businesses from the competitive pressures
of the global market (i.e. import-substitution industrialization). Additionally, many
countries were heavily indebted due to a lack of, or insufficient, domestic savings. The
early 1980s saw a global economic slowdown which decreased the demand for Latin
American exports. Couple this with skyrocketing interest rates and Latin American
countries were unable to make their debt payments. A regional debt crisis ensued,
shaking the very nature of government spending going forward.
Most, if not all, Latin American countries were pressed to implement austerity
programs to curb public spending. The primary sponsor of these cuts was the
International Monetary Fund (IMF). Their programs were intended to reduce inflation
and provide improvement of the internal and external economic imbalances (Cruz-Saco
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Oyague 1998). Along with many other programs, social expenditures were slashed in
many countries. Health, education, and welfare expenditures dropped from an average of
9.1% of GDP in 1982 to 8.3% in 1990 (Huber 2005, 79). This decline was even greater
when considering GDP decreased during this period as well.
While social expenditures were decreasing from the early 1980s to 1990s, the
population living in poverty was increasing. On average, Latin America had 35% of its
population below the poverty line in 1980; this number increased to 39% by 1990
(CEPAL 1995). Austerity measures imposed by the IMF were having their intended
effect of lowering governmental spending, but they were doing so at the detriment of the
population.
As a result of the deep cuts necessitated by the IMF and other external creditors,
several countries experienced mass protests. These protests were termed “IMF riots”
(Walton 2001, 309). In Panama, demonstrators spray painted “IMF get out” on the
marble walls of the legislature. Protestors in Peru staged a twenty mile march from
Lima’s shantytowns to the national palace. Some protests even turned violent. During the
week of Easter in 1984, Dominican Republic protestors rioted due to price increases in
food, medicines, and other imported goods. The riots resulted in approximately sixty
deaths, many more injured, and more than 1,000 arrests (Walton 2001, 318).
The increasing poverty levels and protests experienced within Latin America
caused many international financial institutions to begin focusing less on neoliberal
economic reforms within countries and instead focus on social policy reform. This was
called “adjustment with a human face” (Huber 2005, 91). This was done less for
humanistic reasons but more to protect the economic reforms from social protest. And
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based on the experience of East Asian countries and their recent economic successes,
these international financial institutions began promoting investments in education (as
this was viewed as important to the long-term growth strategy of countries) (Huber 2005,
91-92).
Economic growth returned to the region in the 1990s. Because of this, social
expenditures again rose significantly when compared to the major cuts from the 1980s.
However, due to the decrease in social spending in the previous decade (from neoliberal
economic reforms), many countries had to restructure their social programs.
Social Policy Classification in Latin America
There are several different classification schemes researchers have offered to
describe the nature of different Latin American countries social policies. Huber (2005)
proposed a system based on who administers the social programs; her classification
proposal is broken down into three categories. The first, the Chilean Model, emphasizes
individualization and privatization of social programs. Chile, Mexico and Bolivia have
systems that would fall into this category. The second is a model that stresses unification
and universalization of programs and views the state as being responsible for the welfare
of the population. Costa Rica, Brazil and Uruguay follow this system. The third is a mix
of the first two models, incorporating both a private and a public dimension. Peru,
Columbia and Argentina have chosen to follow this path (Huber 2005, 83-84).
Another way to view the social policies of Latin American countries is to group
them together based on the extent of social policies enacted. As noted at the beginning of
this chapter, Mesa-Lago (1994) attempted to differentiate between pioneer countries,
intermediate countries and latecomers. He further went on to show that the pioneer
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countries went on to have near universalistic social protections, intermediate countries
developed social policies that are continuing to expand coverage and quality of services,
and latecomers have social policies with low coverage rates and limited services.
Some do not agree with Mesa-Lago’s classification scheme that incorporates both
coverage of population and expenditure. They argue that instead of examining how much
is spent, a much better analysis would be to look at how it is spent to benefit the
population (Esping Anderson 1994). The notion of how much is spent is particularly
important in Latin America where some countries spend as much as 18% of gross
domestic product (GDP) annually, while others only spend approximately 8% of GDP
(Filgueira 2005, 12).
Filgueira appreciates the parsimonious nature of Mesa-Lago’s classification
system, however, disagrees with the grouping of countries by the development of social
policy (a continuum basis) and instead argues for a greater focus on the typology of
social states (2005, 11-12). Filgueira contends there were three types of social states in
Latin America from the 1930s to 1970s. The first was a “stratified universal” system.
This type of social policy environment included a vast majority of the population under a
social security and basic health services system (hence “universalistic”). However, the
quality and availability of services depended on the class of citizen, i.e. state employees,
professionals, military personnel, urban/rural workers, unemployed, etc (the “stratified”
portion). This style of social policy was found in Argentina, Uruguay, Chile and Costa
Rica (Filgueira 2005, 13-14).
Other countries preferred a dual system. In this type of social policy environment
there was nearly universal development of primary education and health coverage, but
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social security was stratified based on the territory a citizen lived in. Some areas of the
state had well-developed and inclusionary social protections while others had
exclusionary systems that excluded a majority of the populace. Examples of this type of
policy environment could be found in Mexico and Brazil (Filgueira 2005, 23-24).
Finally, some countries enacted an exclusionary system. As the name implies,
under this type of social policy environment, a vast majority of the population was not
provided social protections. Most often elites in the government created policies that
provided social privileges to specific groups that already enjoyed a privileged status.
Countries with exclusionary social systems in the 1970s included Bolivia, Ecuador,
Nicaragua, El Salvador, Guatemala and Honduras (Filgueira 2005, 30-31).
Interestingly, Filgueira’s (2005) classification system is very similar to MesaLago’s (1994) when countries are inserted into the appropriate designation. But, Filgueira
admits his arrangement of social states only applies prior to the 1970s and contends that
two new types of social states are becoming prevalent in Latin America: a social state
based on neoliberal economic policy and an egalitarian exclusionary basic protection
social state (what he terms as an “embryonic Social Democratic Latin-American State”)
(2005, 10).
In this thesis, I incorporate Mesa-Lago’s (1994) classification of social policy into
its analysis. This is done because it provides both for the legacy of coverage and
expenditure in Latin American countries. While many Latin American systems of social
protection do not resemble their predecessor programs, feelings toward democracy may
still be influenced by the populations experience with these past social policies.
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To this point there has been a high level overview of the history of social
programs in Latin America. What follows is a more specific study of the reforms
experienced within individual countries in Latin America. So as not to become consumed
by individual country specifics, only three countries are included below: Chile, Costa
Rica and Guatemala. No scientific method was utilized to select these cases other than
the legacy of their social protection programs (based on Mesa-Lago 1994) and the level
of reforms implemented (specifically Chile).2
Chile
Technically, Chile was not the first country in Latin America to reform its social
programs. Cuba enacted reforms in the 1960s and early 1970s; however, because Cuban
reforms were due to the adoption of communism and not due to societal/economic
pressures encountered by other Latin American countries, it is outside the scope of this
work. After Cuba, Chile was the first country to enact social reforms in the region.
Chile’s reform began in 1979 and was based on neoliberal economic theory, replacing a
public system with a private welfare program (Mesa-Lago 1997, 497).
From the beginning of the twentieth century until the 1970s, Chile’s spending on
social programs (specifically education, health care and retirement programs) gradually
expanded, but many of the programs did not provide special benefits for the poor
(Raczynski 2000). It was thought that any program instituted would help all citizens,
including those living in poverty, so there was no need to target them specifically with
social programs.

2

If interested in further individual country social policy reforms see Mesa-Lago 1997, Cruz-Saco and
Mesa-Lago 1998, Haggard and Kaufman 2008, Mesa-Lago 2009.
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The growth of Chile’s social programs over the decades was not equality-based,
as differing groups obtained benefits at various times. Organized labor first saw an
expansion of coverage, followed by the urban middle-class, the urban lower-income
groups and finally, the rural population. What resulted was a stratified social system that
had similar, but differing quality, benefits and different eligibility requirements
(Raczynski 2000). This was due primarily to political pressure from various labor
movements that necessitated extending benefits at different times through Chile’s history:
organized unions threatened strikes that could paralyze the economy, white collar
workers received protection after the election 1920 and the victory of a reformist
candidate (who directed his campaign toward the labor and middle-class voters), and civil
servants began to receive benefits during times of unrest when it was essential to keep the
government operating (Mesa-Lago 1978, 30-33).
As Chile’s social policies grew, so too did public spending dedicated for social
programs. Fiscal deficits grew (not only due to social spending - but it was a significant
portion of the annual budget). In 1972 and 1973, the fiscal deficit reached 30% of the
country’s annual GDP (Raczynski 2000). Due to a myriad of factors, but including the
fiscal situation of the country, a military coup occurred in the fall of 1973, led by General
Augusto Pinochet.
The policies the Pinochet government pursued were heavily influenced by
neoliberal philosophy. In short, the size of government would be reduced and the market
would assume a larger role in the allocation of resources. In terms of social programs,
there were significant reductions and a focus on privatization of benefits. Specifically, the
pension system for the elderly/retired was transformed into an individualized system
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administered by the private sector. A private healthcare system, known as ISAPRE, was
set up for the upper class (Raczynski 2000). The poor and middle classes were still served
by a public health system, but the hospitals and clinics experienced declines in the quality
of services as well as a deterioration of the facilities due to inadequate funding; all this
occurring as their health fees increased when citizens received care. This was due to the
departure of the upper class from the public system, specifically their mandatory
contributions to the public healthcare system (Raczynski 2000).
The privatization of the pension system in Chile prohibited new employees (who
had never contributed to the new system) from joining. Instead, the public pension
system was replaced by a mandatory individually funded system that was administered
by competing private companies. The state continued to play a role in the new system;
however, it was mostly a supervisory and regulatory role. Those who had contributed to
the public system were offered the choice to continue to be covered under the old system
or transition to the private one. Due to a significant publicity campaign as well as lower
contributions to the private system, many individuals switched to the private pension
system (Mesa-Lago and Muller 2002, 691).
In 1990, General Pinochet relinquished power and democratic elections were
held. The newly elected leaders decided to continue the social policy reforms enacted
under the Pinochet regime. This was done due to the popularity of the pension system,
the cost saving measures achieved from the reforms, as well as the new government’s
desire to maintain investor confidence (Mesa-Lago and Muller 2002, 691). To date, no
other Latin American country has adopted the extent of privatized reforms Chile enacted
(Mesa-Lago 1997); however, several countries have modeled some of their reforms from
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the privatized approach introduced by Chile. To this day, Chile continues to have a
privatized pension system and a mixed public/private healthcare system in place.
Costa Rica
Social policy in Costa Rica has a long history and one that is short on reforms.
The reforms enacted have ensured an even better quality of social protections for the
population, even while being confronted by declining state revenues. The country is
thought to be the closest example of a “universalistic egalitarian social state” in the
region (Filgueira 2005, 21).
The first major social security fund in Costa Rica found its origin in 1941, under
the Calderon administration. The Costa Rica Social Security Fund (CCSS) operated
sickness, maternity and pension programs and was initially limited to the only those who
were salaried urban workers. In 1960, only 15% of the total population (25% of the
economically active population) was covered under CCSS (Mesa-Lago 1994, 95). In
1961, a constitutional amendment was adopted that required universal pension coverage
and health protection within ten years. This goal was not achieved. But coverage under
CCSS doubled, covering over 50% of the economically active population (Haggard and
Kaufman 2008, 92).
Another reform was approved in the early 1970s. The modification increased the
salary caps on social insurance contributions and increased the employer share of
contributions. Perhaps the most beneficial aspect of the reform was the expansion of
primary healthcare units in rural areas (Haggard and Kaufman 2008, 92). In 1970,
healthcare coverage was available to 38% of the total population; in 1979 that increased
to 84% due to the reforms earlier in the decade (Mesa-Lago 1994, 96).
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The economic crisis that destabilized the region in the 1980s also affected Costa
Rica. Fortunately for Costa Ricans, their social programs were not cut as drastically as
some of the others in Latin America. The reforms Costa Rica introduced in the late 1980s
and early 1990s were not intended to structurally change the social programs already in
place but were proposed to reduce the expenditures of CCSS (Mesa-Lago 1997, 507).
In 1996, CCSS’ board of directors approved several new amendments to the
country’s social security program. These included an increase in the retirement age, a
tighter pension formula, and a higher insured contribution. Unfortunately, the
government or CCSS did not discuss these proposed changes with the various social
organizations in Costa Rica. Once these restructurings were made public, citizens
occupied CCSS’ offices and achieved their goal of suspending the reform (Mesa-Lago
and Muller 2002, 703).
The topic of pension reform was not over in the country. The government and
CCSS realized the need to discuss any proposed changes to the system with citizens and
the various social organizations. In 2000, after obtaining the input of the necessary
individuals and groups, Costa Rica approved a reform to their pension system. Major
items of the reform included a tighter pension formula, higher contribution rates, and the
addition of social assistance pensions designed to cover the uninsured poor above 70
years of age; an increase in the retirement age was not included (Mesa-Lago and Muller
2002, 704).
The Costa Rican experience with social policy reform was much more minor
than nearly all other countries in Latin America. Many researchers believe this was due to
the countries long, uninterrupted experience with democracy (Mesa-Lago 1994, Mesa-
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Lago and Muller 2002, Filgueira 2005). Other significant factors that encouraged the
development of social policy in the country include the absence of armed forces (no
defense expenditures), a culturally integrated population, and a fairly prosperous rural
sector in comparison to other Latin American countries (Mesa-Lago 1994, 97). While the
reforms in Chile received much attention due to the transition to a largely private social
policy environment, Costa Rica is evidence that a largely public model is also a viable
solution.
Guatemala
Guatemala has not reformed its social security system, nor has it altered its health
policy. Without much knowledge of Guatemala’s social policy environment, one might
wonder if its initial programs were working as intended. Unfortunately, after looking at
basic development indicators it is obvious that Guatemala is largely failing their populace
in terms of social protections. The country is one of the poorest in Latin America (CruzSaco 1998, 333) and based on World Databank figures, in 2010 the infant mortality rate
was approximately 25 deaths per thousand (of the other Latin American countries, only
Bolivia was worse, with over 42 deaths per thousand live births). Clearly there is a need
to improve upon the social protections of the populace.
The Guatemalan Institute of Social Security (IGSS) began in 1946 and it was
intended to provide social protections to the working class against occupational, healthrelated and old age risks (Cruz-Saco 1998, 333). Along with the country’s ministry of
health (MSPAS), IGSS is also responsible for health care in the country. Although, as
will be noted, the amount expended for health care is very minor.
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The pension system in Guatemala is highly stratified. IGSS operates a pension
fund that covered approximately 1.1 million individuals in 1992, or approximately 22%
of the population (Global Extension of Social Security). Part of the low coverage rates
could be due to other pension funds covering certain workers, i.e. public administration
employees, armed forces personnel, journalists, artists, and university professors (CruzSaco 1998, 333-334). However, another reason for the low coverage rates is that many
individuals work in the informal sector which creates difficulties for the Guatemalan
social security system.
Medical care in Guatemala is largely the responsibility of IGSS and MSPAS.
They provide hospital care, medical treatments, dental care and medication. Together
they administer 80% of the hospital beds in the country and 40% of the hospitals.
Although they are responsible for nearly all the health care in the nation, they only spend
approximately $25 per person per year for health services (Cruz-Saco 1998, 333).
IGSS is funded by contributions from the employee, the employer and the state.
The employee and employer portions are a fixed percentage of wages. Unfortunately,
poor enforcement of policies and administrative procedures has derailed the program’s
ability to collect revenue (Cruz-Saco 1998, 341). Many workplaces that are required to
contribute to the fund are not on the appropriate lists that determine the payment
amounts. Also, there are few policies in place for the enforcement of the mandatory
contributions. It is estimated that approximately 50% of employers registered with IGSS
fail to contribute to the fund. This could be due to the need for the cash for their own
personal needs, limited access to health providers, or because of the perceived low
quality of benefits received (Cruz-Saco 1998, 336).
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The Guatemalan social protection system is in great need of reform. Their citizens
are evading payment to the fund; however, because of poor administrative and
enforcement policies these violations are left unknown or unpunished. When considering
how high their infant mortality rate is compared with the rest of the region, the low
amounts of healthcare spending are cause for concern. Unfortunately, there has been little
discussion of reform of the Guatemalan system.

The history of social policy in Latin America is a history of reform. Sometimes
those reforms increased coverage of the population; sometimes those reforms were
intended only to cut costs. There does not appear to be a common cause for the reforms
enacted in the three countries examined (Chile, Guatemala, and Costa Rica). There does
appear to be striking differences in the administration of social benefits. Chile has opted
for a privatized system. Costa Rica has continued with their universal, government
administered social programs. Unfortunately, Guatemala’s social programs are largely
failing its population.
However, as noted in the above section, the reduction of social benefits in many
countries led to protesting and riots (Walton 2001). The citizens could endure austerity
cuts; however, when that meant an ever greater number of the population falling into
poverty, they reacted. Fortunately for the region, the subsequent prosperity after the debt
crisis has provided an opportunity for many countries to increase their level of social
spending.
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Chapter 3: Theory and Methods
To this point, much focus has been on the development of social states in Latin
America. While this is important information, we still need to know if social programs
enacted by Latin American countries affect a citizen’s satisfaction with democracy.
Perhaps the better question would be: should social programs improve satisfaction with
democracy? This chapter intends to lay out the theoretical and methodological framework
that will guide the remainder of the research.
The chapter proceeds as follows. First there will be a review of the satisfaction
with democracy literature, followed by a review of social democratic theory. A section
describing the methods to be employed in this research is included to inform of the
technique utilized to select cases for the qualitative study, as well as the quantitative
method to be employed to study the relationship across several countries in Latin
America. Finally, a section is devoted to the variables utilized in the quantitative
research.
Satisfaction with Democracy
There is reason to believe social spending could affect a citizen’s satisfaction with
democracy. Elites create the democratic institutions in countries, but rely on the support
of the citizens for continued institutional existence. Because of this, elites might create
social protections to shelter citizens from poverty, unemployment, health concerns, etc.
Unfortunately, there has been little research investigating this relationship. What follows
is a review of the existent satisfaction with democracy literature.
Early research on satisfaction with democracy focused on the political culture of a
country. Almond and Verba stated that for a democracy to survive, a political culture that
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is consistent with democratic ideals is necessary (1963, 3). As defined, political culture
“refers to specifically political orientations – attitudes toward the political system and its
various parts, and attitudes toward the role of the self in the system” (Almond and Verba
1963, 12). A significant part of a political culture is the attitudes toward and satisfaction
with the democratic process that is occurring within a country.
For countries without a strong political culture (most Latin American countries
could be included here due to their history of transition between democracy and
authoritarianism), Almond and Verba provided two ways in which a country can foster its
development. First, they note that the emergence of political culture is a gradual process
and is best fostered in a relatively crisis-free climate. Unfortunately for Latin America,
the 20th century included many crises – whether it was changes in the form of
government or economic crisis.
Second, a national political culture will develop by “fusion,” when new attitudes
and beliefs combine with old values (Almond and Verba 1963, 368). While they
acknowledge democratic values and democracy develop over time, increasing the
education of the population may decrease the amount of time needed (Almond and Verba
1963, 370). So, the best way for Latin Americans to develop a political culture that will
help to solidify democracy in the region would be through education.
Satisfaction with democracy may be a component of a nation’s political culture
(the debate over whether political culture actually exists is a valid and well-researched
topic – but it is outside the scope of this work so no additional mention will be made
herein), but does not fully explain what contributes to a citizen’s attitude toward
democracy. In Western Europe, a citizen’s evaluation of the economy (both their own
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economic situation and that of the entire country) is a significant predictor of satisfaction
with democracy (Anderson and Guillory 1997, 77). Also significant to a citizen’s
satisfaction with democracy is whether they voted for the incumbent governing party.
They tend to be more satisfied than those who voted for the losing party (Anderson and
Guillory 1997). This latter finding was again supported in a later study of Canadian
federal elections; again noting that individuals who voted for the winning party reported
higher satisfaction with democracy (Blais and Gelineau 2007).3
Relevant to the current study of satisfaction of democracy in Latin America,
Lagos (2001) reviewed the results of the 2000 Latinobarometer survey of seventeen
countries in Latin America. She was specifically interested in the differences between
support for and satisfaction with democracy. She noted Latin Americans have been fairly
stable in their support for democracy as a political system (although support for an
authoritarian system is also fairly prevalent in the region). But, satisfaction with
democracy – a measure of how satisfied a citizen is with the way democracy functions in
their respective country – is much lower in all the countries. Lagos does note that a
measure of satisfaction with democracy is sensitive to the economic conditions of a
country, but she also states the lower rates of satisfaction with democracy found in Latin
America may be a cause for concern, these democratic governments may not be fully
established and their lower satisfaction rates could indicate future democratic difficulties
(2001, 141).

3

Unfortunately, the Latinobarometer does not ask respondents who they voted for in the previous election.
In 2010 they began asking if there is a party the individual feels closest to. For the 2005 survey that is
utilized in this research, the closest question asked is who the individual would vote for if elections were
held tomorrow. Unfortunately, future voting predictions are not measuring the same phenomena that were
reported in these studies.

23

Interestingly, the same phenomenon is observed in Africa. The vast majority of
Africans support the democratic form of government but a smaller percentage, in
comparison, is satisfied with the way democracy works in their country (Bratton, Mattes,
and Gyimah-Boadi 2005). However, these authors are not surprised by this finding.
Instead, they believe satisfaction is the more demanding measure and would therefore lag
behind support for democracy (Bratton, Mattes, and Gyimah-Boadi 2005, 81).
While comparing the level of support for and satisfaction with democracy across
the newly democratic regions of the world, Lagos (2003) found Latin America had the
lowest average support for democracy and Africa had the highest level of support.
However, Lagos notes that responses on “support for democracy” survey questions
depend on the individual’s concept of democracy. Specifically, democracy could mean
equality in Latin America but infer liberty in Eastern European countries (Lagos 2003,
471). She concludes that it is very difficult to compare support and satisfaction scores
across regions. Fortunately for the analysis in this research, only Latin American
countries are included. This makes comparison more meaningful.
In researching if socioeconomic conditions in Latin America affect citizens’
support for democracy, Carlin (2006) found educated and wealthy individuals to be the
most supportive of existing democracies. Inequality and poverty are negatively associated
with satisfaction with democracy. A surprise finding in the research was that a higher
level of unemployment indicated a higher level of satisfaction with democracy. Carlin
could not explain this finding but did suggest future research should test if individuallevel employment data would provide the same conclusions.
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While interesting, Carlin’s (2006) data was aggregated to the country-level. While
many of his independent variables were country-level indicators, satisfaction with
democracy is an individual-level phenomenon. One must be skeptical while reviewing
the results. There are dangers (mainly of committing the ecological fallacy) of concluding
on individual-level attitudes based on aggregated data.
Not all researchers agree the measure of “satisfaction with democracy” as
currently measured is the most accurate measure of political support in a country. Most
often, satisfaction with democracy is determined based on a survey question that
generally asks “On the whole, are you very satisfied, fairly satisfied, not very satisfied, or
not at all satisfied with the way democracy works in (country)?”4 Researchers question if
the variable is measuring support for the performance of the government and the existing
political incumbents (Dalton 1999), support for the existing governmental institutions
(Fuchs, Guidorossi and Svenson 1995; Lockerbie 1993) or if it is a summary indicator
that includes evaluations of incumbents as well as institutions (Clarke, Dutt and Kornberg
1993).
Canache, Mondak, and Seligson (2001) concluded that the satisfaction with
democracy question measures multiple dimensions of political support. Furthermore,
what is being measured varies by individuals and across countries. The variance for
individuals is due to varying levels of political knowledge and the variance among
countries is due to different interpretations of what is being asked. They suggest this
results in two major problems. First, a researcher does not know what the variable is
measuring. Secondly, there is no way to interpret data across observations because of the
difficulty of determining what the respondent based their response (i.e. incumbent
4

This is also how the Latinobarometer measures satisfaction with democracy.

25

support, institutional support, etc). They caution any future use of the variable and any
analysis that utilizes a measure of satisfaction with democracy should be very careful in
analyzing and presenting the data.
Bratton, Mattes, and Gyimah-Boadi (2005) encountered a similar situation when
they surveyed citizens of various African countries. The measure of satisfaction with
democracy in their survey was representative of three separate attitudes: satisfaction with
the current political regime, satisfaction with democratic institutions, and satisfaction
with incumbent politicians. However, in the African survey evaluations of government
performance had the largest influence on an individual’s satisfaction with democracy
(Bratton, Mattes, and Gyimah-Boadi 2005, 83).
In order to narrow the scope of what is being measured when individuals are
asked about their satisfaction with democracy, Evans and Whitefield (1995) attempted
asking the question in a different way. To measure the general support for democracy,
they asked “how do you feel about the aim of introducing democracy, in which parties
compete for government.” To determine satisfaction with democracy, they inquired “how
would you evaluate the actual practice of democracy so far” (the italics are theirs). These
questions clearly differentiate between support for the concept of democracy and
satisfaction with how democracy is performing in the selected countries. Unfortunately,
their survey was conducted in former Soviet countries and will not aid in the current
research.
Previous research indicates a citizen’s satisfaction with democracy is contingent
on many factors. Economic consideration, levels of education, who the individual voted
for in the previous election, etc. all affect attitudes toward democracy. But does a
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country’s social policy environment also contribute? Social democratic theory would
hypothesize it does.
Social Democratic Theory
The importance of social welfare in a democratic state has a long history. In De
Legibus, Cicero wrote “salus populi suprema lex esto.” Translated this means “let the
welfare of the people be the supreme law.” More recently, Lipset (1959) concluded that a
larger middle class and higher educated populace aids (but does not guarantee) a
consolidation of democracy. Even more recently, Dahl stated that democracy is
dependent upon citizens’ confidence in their government to react and satisfactorily
manage unemployment, poverty, corruption, welfare programs, etc (1998, 2).
According to social democratic theory, equal respect for all people is a key tenet
of democracy and it is to be addressed by the state (Petit 1987). This is unlike liberal
democratic theory, which believes equal respect should be left to individuals.
Additionally, social democratic theory is a bridge between democracy and universal
rights, providing the former with stability (Meyer and Hinchman 2007, 1).
Central to social democratic theory is the belief that inequality is inherent in the
world we live in. These inequalities take many different forms, such as information
inequality, political inequality, and economic inequality. To help remedy these
inequalities, social democratic theory calls upon the state to enact policies that attempt to
empower those who are relatively deprived. This is done through governmental
institutions that are created to promote equality (Petit 1987). Many of these institutions
would fall under the auspices of a welfare state.
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Additionally, social democratic theory states that the economy of a nation will not
grow when individuals are left to flourish or perish on their own. Governments are tasked
with investing in the human resources of a country to promote economic growth but also
provide a social safety net for those who do not benefit (or are harmed by) the overall
economic growth in a country. For the state, wealth creation, while important, is
incidental to redistribution of resources and economic security (Giddens 1998).
Social democratic theory works well in the case of Latin America’s social policy
reform, even though many of the restructurings were completed following neoliberal
theories. The World Bank and other international financial institutions noted the value of
investing in the human resources of countries (Huber 2005). Although this was done
under the pretext of pacifying the citizens to prevent a revolt against the economic
reforms that were occurring, this dovetails with social democratic theory and the
beginnings of the welfare state. As Aspalter (2001, 49) notes, “Poverty (in the sense:
‘poor, but not too poor to protest’) constituted the fundamental basis of social uprisings
and the new social movements, which saw democracy as the means of improving their
living conditions and obtaining a fair share of the national income.”
The impact of social democratic theory has been implied (but often not expressly
stated) in previous scholarly work on satisfaction with democracy studies. In examining
support for democracy in Africa, Bratton, Mattes and Gyimah-Boadi (2005) noted that in
new democracies “political leaders who must account to a mass electorate are inclined to
deliver welfare services, which in turn increases the stock of human capital required for
economic advancement.” Additionally, Eastern Europeans were asked what they
associated with democracy. While the idea of freedom was the most common answer,
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social welfare benefits also received more than 10% of the responses (Simon 1996). This
would indicate that many individuals (at least in Eastern Europe) associate social benefits
with democracy. If Latin Americans do the same, their country’s social policies could
impact their satisfaction with democracy.
Methods of Testing
For the purpose of this research, the question of how social spending influences
an individual’s attitude toward democracy will be tested two separate ways. A qualitative
analysis will be conducted utilizing a case study approach. Following that will be a
quantitative investigation to analyze the Latin American region.
Due to scarce research investigating a country’s social spending on citizen’s
attitudes toward democracy, the aim of the qualitative study is more exploratory in
nature. Any substantive findings from this research will be utilized during the
quantitative section, which is directed more toward hypothesis-testing. Three of the
eighteen Latin American countries for which social spending data is available will be
included in the qualitative study. To select countries for the qualitative analysis the mostdifferent systems selection method will be employed. The countries with the most, least
and mid-range social spending (in terms of the national GDP) in 2005 will be selected.
Using this method the sample cases are Brazil, Venezuela, and Ecuador. These countries
incurred social expenses of 22.51%, 11.52% and 6.25% of their total GDP in 2005,
respectively (CEPALSTAT).
By selecting three diverse countries, the qualitative study will only allow for
generalizations across the cases but will not provide strong support for the causality of
relationships found (Seawright and Gerring 2008). Additionally, selection bias is not a
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concern because the cases were selected based on the primary explanatory variable of
interest. This too will limit the generality of the conclusions to other Latin American
countries (King, Keohane, and Verba 1994, 135), but it should not be of concern due to
the quantitative analysis that will be done subsequently.
In addition to the case study proposed above, a quantitative analysis will be
completed to analyze the level of social welfare spending incurred by a government and
its affect on citizens’ attitudes toward democracy. Because this type of analysis utilizes
both macro-level data (social welfare spending) and micro-level attitudes (satisfaction
with democracy) a hierarchical linear model will be employed. As Luke indicated, this
type of model allows a researcher to examine the larger context that may be shaping
individual-level attitudes without committing an ecological fallacy (2004). For this
reason there is little concern for committing an ecological fallacy during the qualitative
analysis. All eighteen countries for which social spending data is available are included in
the analysis (see Table 3.1).
Table 3.1 - Latin American Countries Included in Thesis
Argentina
Bolivia
Brazil
Chile
Colombia
Costa Rica

Dominican Republic
Ecuador
El Salvador
Guatemala
Honduras
Mexico

Nicaragua
Panama
Paraguay
Peru
Uruguay
Venezuela

In both the qualitative and quantitative analyses, it is hypothesized that increased
levels of social spending will result in higher levels of satisfaction with democracy.
Below are the variables included in the quantitative analysis.
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Dependent Variable: Attitudes toward Democracy
The dependent variable in the quantitative portion of this research is citizens’
satisfaction with democracy. The measure was obtained from the Latinobarometer survey
conducted in 2005. Similar to past “satisfaction” studies, the question asks:
In general, would you say that you are very satisfied, fairly satisfied, not very
satisfied, or not at all satisfied with the way democracy works in (country)?
In the survey, those who respond they are very satisfied are coded as “1,” fairly satisfied
as “2,” etc. For ease of evaluation, the variable has been inverted so that higher levels of
satisfaction correspond with higher scores (i.e. very satisfied responses have been
recoded to “4,” satisfied to “3,” etc).
Because some researchers advocate caution when using a measure of satisfaction
with democracy (Canache, Mondak, and Seligson 2001; Linde and Ekman 2003), a brief
word to its use in this research is necessary. The intention of this study is to determine if
the amount a country spends to provide a basic level of protection for its citizens results
in satisfied feelings toward democracy. While the above question may be flawed for
reasons already discussed, there are no other widely available survey responses that
would measure this attitude. As such, while it is admitted that in a perfect world a more
accurate indicator for satisfaction with democracy would be utilized, this is the best
currently available.
Independent Variables – Social Spending
The primary explanatory variable is a country’s level of social spending. This is
measured as a percentage of GDP (both social spending and GDP measured in current
local currency units) to normalize the data across countries and determine the relative
importance each country places on social policies. In addition to overall social spending,
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included are the four social policy categories that make up the total. These include health,
education, social security and housing expenditures. All four are also measured as a
percentage of GDP. The inclusion of the components of social spending will allow
conclusions regarding if certain types of social spending affect a citizen’s satisfaction
with democracy more than another type. All the data was obtained from the Economic
Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (CEPAL).
Legacy of Social Security Systems
Based upon the research of Mesa-Lago (1994), the year countries instituted social
security policies largely predicted subsequent population coverage and expenditure. He
differentiated between pioneer countries, intermediate countries and latecomers. Because
a citizen’s views on social policy could be influenced by their history with such policy
(and those attitudes toward social policy could affect their satisfaction with democracy),
dummy variables are included to account for pioneer and intermediate countries. See
Table 2.1 for the countries that are included in each category.
Citizen’s Attitudes toward the Availability of Health Care/Education
Included in the Latinobarometer survey are questions regarding the respondent’s
satisfaction with access to health care and education. The inclusion of this independent
variable is because citizens may not know, care, or understand how much their
government is spending on social policies (although it is assumed higher levels of social
spending will result in higher quality and access to programs). These variables will
directly measure the satisfaction with access to health care and education without
considerations of how much was spent. It may also indicate that social spending in
certain countries is not translating into better quality programs.
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The question in the survey asks:
In general, would you say that you are very satisfied, fairly
satisfied, not very satisfied or not at all satisfied with: your access
to health (your access to education)?
Similar to the satisfaction with democracy question, individuals who respond they are
very satisfied are coded as “1,” fairly satisfied as “2,” etc. This variable has also been
reverse coded so that higher levels of satisfaction are coded with higher scores.
Control variables
Several control variables are included in the analysis based on previous
satisfaction with democracy research. Demographic variables such as age, level of
education, and employment status are included. These three variables are included in the
model as dummy variables for ease of interpretation. The respondent’s age is classified as
16-25, 26-40, or 41-60. The referent category is those over 61 years of age. Level of
education is denoted either as some/completed primary school, some/completed technical
school, or some/completed secondary school. The reference category for education is
those who have no education. Respondents’ employment status is included either as
employed, retired, homemaker, or student. The referent category is the unemployed.
These variables are all obtained from the Latinobarometer study and are measured at the
individual-level. Another control variable from the Latinobarometer study is the citizen’s
economic evaluations, both for the economy of the country and their individual economic
situation5. This is an ordinal-level variable with values that can range from 1 to 5. Lower
numbers indicate worse economic evaluations on behalf of the respondent.

5

Similar to the Anderson and Guillory (1997) study, the questions used to determine a citizen’s economic
evaluation are: “Do you consider the current economic situation of the country to be much better, a little
better, about the same, a little worse or much worse than 12 months ago?” and “Do you consider your
economic situation and that of your family to be much better, a little better, about the same, a little worse
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In addition to the individual-level control variables, some country-level control
variables are included in the model. A measure of the level of democracy in each country
is included, as measured by the Polity IV Project. Additionally, a measure of overall
economic development in the country is included. This is quantified by the use of the
infant mortality rate. This measure may be used as a proxy for level of development, as
argued by Sen (1998). Oftentimes, infant mortality is reflective of material living
standards within a country, levels of education, gender inequalities and health care
systems (Sen 1998). The largest advantage of utilizing the infant mortality rate as a proxy
for development is the availability of data since nearly all countries report this statistic.
Based upon the World Bank, where the data was obtained, the infant mortality rate is
defined as the number of children (per 1,000 live births) who die before the age of one.

Guided by social democratic theory, this research intends to utilize both
qualitative and quantitative analyses to determine the relationship between social
spending and a citizen’s satisfaction with democracy. The research draws upon past
studies’ findings regarding what influences a citizen’s satisfaction with democracy while
also providing improvements to the testing of citizen-level attitudes. The principal
advancement of this study is the use of a hierarchical linear model that allows for an
analysis of the impact of country-level variables on citizen-level attitudes.
After considering social democratic theory, and its tenet of eliminating
inequalities, it is hypothesized that country’s with higher levels of social spending will
have citizens report higher levels of satisfaction with democracy. Increasing satisfaction

or much worse than 12 months ago?” Because better economic evaluations are coded with lower numbers,
this variable has been inverted as well for ease of analysis.
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with democracy is important for the consolidation of democracy in Latin America and to
prevent a slide back to authoritarianism.

35

Chapter 4: Social Spending and Satisfaction with Democracy: A Case Study
Approach - Brazil, Venezuela, and Ecuador
As noted in the previous chapter, three countries have been selected to analyze as
case studies of social spending/policies. The countries selected were chosen for their
level of total social spending: Brazil (highest social spending in the region), Ecuador
(lowest social spending), and Venezuela (mid-level social spending). Each country is
examined individually, followed by a concluding section providing an analysis of the
results.
Brazil
Brazil has a varied and tumultuous history with democracy, often reverting back
to military dictatorships until the 1980s. The most recent transition from a military
dictatorship occurred in 1985 with the election of Tancredo Neves (who unfortunately
became sick prior to his inauguration and was replaced by his Vice President – Jose
Sarney). Since this time, democracy has remained.
At the time of the 2005 Latinobarometer survey, Brazil had been a democracy for
20 years. At that time, in the aggregate, Brazilians expressed an overall dissatisfaction
with their democracy. The average Brazilian respondent in the Latinobarometer survey
indicated a “not very satisfied” response when asked how satisfied they are with the
development of democracy in their country.6
In 2005, Brazil’s social spending (as a percentage of GDP) was the highest
compared to all other Latin American countries. In total, they spent 22.52% of the gross
domestic product on education, health, social security, and housing programs. By far, the
largest portion of that was spent on social security (12.28%), followed by education
6

Brazil’s aggregate satisfaction with democracy score was 1.97 out of a total of 4.
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(4.55%), and health programs (4.32%). The country spent only 1.37% on housing-related
programs in 2005 (CEPALSTAT).
The first Brazilian public insurance fund began in 1923 and was provided to
railway workers. Today, Brazil’s pension system provides constitutionally guaranteed
protections to both public and private sector employees, in the form of defined-benefit
plans. These two categories of employees are separated into different types of plans with
differing eligibility requirements and benefits.
The pension plan for private sector employees requires an 8-10% contribution
from the employee (dependent on their income), as well as a 20% employer contribution.
These contributions provide benefits for old age, disability, and early retirement (based
on years of service). The standard retirement age (to receive “old age” benefits) is 65 for
men and 60 for women. To qualify for early retirement, males and females must work 30
and 25 years, respectively. Additionally, early retirement benefits are approximately two
times that of the standard old age pension (Kane 1998).
The pension plan for government employees is fully-funded by the government. It
provides a normal retirement pension for men who work for 30 years and women who
work 35 years. It also offers a special retirement for teachers and politicians. These
benefits can be obtained for men and women after 30 and 25 years of service,
respectively. This pension plan, when equally compared, offers a pension that is four
times greater than that for private employees (Kane 1998).
Brazil’s health program, like that of many of the social programs in Latin
America, is an evolving system. From 1964 to the mid-1980s, under a military
dictatorship, health care was centralized with the federal government. Approximately
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75% of the patients admitted to the hospital were financed and managed by the federal
government (Lewis and Medici 1998). At this time, Brazil’s health system was intended
to provide health services to the entire population. But in reality, coverage was uneven
and the services provided were selective (Lewis and Medici 1998, 269).
After the transition to democracy, the country enacted health care reform
(Reforma Sanitara). Most, if not all, of these reforms were codified in the 1988
constitution. The central tenant of the reform (and provided for in the constitution) was
universal and equal access to health services. To accomplish this, the federal government
opted to pass the responsibility of administering health programs and clinics to the
municipalities. The federal government would provide financial and technical assistance
as needed, the states would manage a few of the previously-federal institutions, but the
primary responsibility for the provision of healthcare services would be with the
municipalities.
Very quickly problems were encountered due to the three levels of health care
administration (federal, state and municipal level). While very loose duties were assigned
to each level of government, clear delineation of responsibilities was never established.
Also, transferring health clinics to the municipalities created its own set of conflicts.
Larger municipalities (those with over 1 million in population) were better able to
manage the healthcare of their population than were smaller municipalities. Those very
small towns (5,000 to 30,000 in population) did not have the expertise or the resources to
manage and deliver services effectively of efficiently. Also, due to the shift of health
clinic operations to municipalities, numerous clinics began to be constructed. Many small
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municipalities were not able to complete the clinic in their area due to insufficient funds
(Lewis and Medici 1998).
Due to these problems, it should not be surprising that when Brazilians were
asked about their satisfaction with the access to healthcare in the 2005 Latinobarometer
survey, the average response was little better than not very satisfied.7 Brazil does not
spend as much as several other Latin American countries on healthcare. Coupled with the
logistical problems of the entire system, it is not difficult to understand the prevalence of
dissatisfaction with the healthcare system.
In terms of the quality of healthcare, the 2005 infant mortality rate in Brazil was
23.3 (World Databank). Although this was a decrease from 41 just 10 years prior, it was
still high in comparison to the remainder of Latin American countries. Similarly, Brazil
does not fare well when comparing life expectancy across other Latin American
countries. In 2005, the life expectancy of a newborn was approximately 71.5 years. This
again places Brazil near the bottom of all Latin American countries, but they are trending
upwards. In 1995, the average life expectancy was 68.3 years.
In 2003, Brazil began a program (Bolsa Familia) aimed to immediately improve
healthcare and reduce poverty (by providing cash transfers to eligible citizens) and to
develop their human capital (through education and healthcare conditionalities). Recent
estimates place total recipients in the program at approximately 11 million households
(Soares et al 2010, 174). Additionally, in the short time it has been in existence, Bolsa
Familia has been credited with a significant reduction in income inequality in Brazil
(Soares et al 2006).

7

After recoding the Latinobarometer survey results (as noted in Chapter 3), the average numerical response
was 2.18 out of a total of 4 for this question.
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To obtain the cash transfers under Bolsa Familia, the first qualification is that
households must earn less than approximately $70 per capita monthly. If met, the other
conditions to receive payment are: parents must ensure their children are attending
school, are receiving required vaccinations, and are regularly visiting health clinics.
These policies have led to marked increases in school attendance and a decrease in dropout rates, but have failed to have an impact on child immunizations or health clinic visits
(Soares et al 2010). This lack of impact on the health visits and immunizations of
children could stem from the lack of adequate health clinics in many parts of the country
(as noted previously).
Interestingly, it does not appear the Bolsa Familia program has had much of an
affect bolstering citizen’s satisfaction with democracy. However, the students who were
affected by Bolsa Familia are still school-age so any positive effects would not be
evident yet. Also, the healthcare portion of the program is not functioning as intended.
Many children are missing their required health clinic visits and not receiving their
immunizations. Finally, the cash transfer portion to benefit families was still new when
the 2005 Latinobarometer survey was conducted and many adults may not have fully
internalized its benefits.
Prior to Bolsa Familia, the government of Brazil implemented several reforms
aimed directly at improving education in the 1980s and 1990s. They declared free basic
education to be a fundamental right, established national testing for students, and
implemented the current structure of the educational system in the country: grades 1-8
provided by state and local governments and grades 9-11 run by state governments (Di
Gropello 2006, 63). Educational reforms were greatly needed in the country as only 66%
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and 43% of 18 years olds had completed the fourth grade and eighth grade in 1996,
respectively (Herran and Rodriguez 2000). Additionally, the average young Brazilian
enters the workforce with approximately only six years of schooling (World Bank 2004,
38).
However, the news is not entirely bad for Brazil’s education system. The
percentage of children ages 7-14 attending school has increased from 80.5% to 96.5%
between 1991 and 2000 (World Bank 2004, 38). Also, between 2000 and 2003, Brazil
was the only country in Latin America and East Asia whose Program for International
Student Achievement scores (sponsored by the Organization for Economic Cooperation
and Development) increased in all three areas tested: mathematics, reading, and science
(Di Gropello 2006, 66). Other countries have taken notice of Brazil’s educational reforms
and the country is often considered a model for educational reform (World Bank 2004,
38). Brazilian citizens also recognize some of the inroads the government has made and
have expressed a sentiment in-between “not very satisfied” and “somewhat satisfied” in
terms of their access to education (Latinobarometer 2005).8
Overall, education in Brazil is improving; however improvements are still needed
for those citizens in poverty. Future improvements should be aimed at decreasing
inequalities in the system. Some have suggested Brazil should focus future programs on
helping the poorest of the population attain at least an 8th grade education or targeting
more of its education expenditures toward the lowest income earners (World Bank 2004;
Di Gropello 2006).

8

The average score for Brazilians, when asked how satisfied they were with their access to education, was
2.42 out of 4 in the 2005 Latinobarometer survey.
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Economic considerations must also be considered that could impact Brazilians’
satisfaction with democracy. In 2005, Brazil’s unemployment rate was 9.3% of the total
workforce (World Databank). This does appear to be high; however, that percentage is
comparable to other Latin American countries. Another concern for Brazil (as it relates to
the targeting of social policy), is the income inequality experienced within the country.
Hall (2006) notes Brazil has the seventh most unequal income distribution in the world.
This income inequality can do little to help citizen’s satisfaction with democracy.
Overall, Brazil spends a lot of money on their social security program. It provides
near universal coverage for the working population in the formal sector. But, this
program only benefits a small segment of the population (principally retirement age or
disabled individuals) and may not have as much influence over the average citizen’s
satisfaction with democracy. The Bolsa Familia program was intended to help bolster the
education and health of the poorest segment of the population. Unfortunately, this
program is too new to be able to examine its affect on satisfaction with democracy.
Venezuela
Prior to the presidency of Hugo Chavez and his socialist/populist government,
Venezuela was one of the longest standing democracies in Latin America (from 1958 to
1998). Although democratic through this time period, the country did not adopt inclusive
social policies. Many social benefits were reserved for public employees. With the
election of Hugo Chavez, and the increasing price of oil, Venezuela was better able to
provide social programs to the population. This is especially true when analyzing health
and education programs.

42

Venezuela and Ecuador were the least democratic nations in Latin America in
2005. Interestingly though, the aggregate satisfaction with democracy score for
Venezuela was one of the highest in the region.9 Part of the reason for this high score
could be the various programs implemented in the country targeting the poorest citizens.
In total, Venezuela spent 11.51% of its GDP on social programs in 2005. 4.64% was
spent on education-related programs, 3.91% for social security, 1.63% for health, and
1.33% for housing programs. These numbers do not tell the entire story though. These
percentages for Venezuela are general government expenditures. Several of the social
programs are at least partially (if not fully) subsidized by oil revenues. Additionally, there
are concerns that Chavez is utilizing social programs as a way to “purchase” the votes of
the poor and working class (who make up the majority of the population) (PenfoldBecerra 2006).
Venezuelan social security was created in 1940. It protected workers from
sickness, maternity, and disability pensions. Reforms in 1966 extended coverage to
include old age and death and expanded benefits to public employees and union leaders.
Later reforms in the 1980s and 1990s required all salaried employees, both public and
private, to be covered by the state social security institute (Instituto Venezolano de
Seguros Sociales or “IVSS”). Although this would seem like it would cover a majority of
the workers in Venezuela, it still only covered approximately 35% of the economically
active population in 1993 (Mesa-Lago and Arenas 1998, 355).
The economic crisis that impacted Latin America in the 1980s and1990s also
affected Venezuela. As a result, in 1997 the country adopted a private pension program

9

The average score for Venezuela in the 2005 Latinobarometer study, when respondents were asked how
satisfied they are with democracy in their country was 2.72 (out of a possible 4).
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for covered workers under a certain age and all new entrants to the program.
Interestingly, the country never implemented this privatized pension system (Weyland
2005, 266) and it has been abolished under the Chavez government. However, social
security pension coverage has improved little since 1993. Currently, only approximately
half of the population over 60 years of age (the age of eligibility) receives any form of
pension from the government (Fernandez-Salas 2010).
Access to healthcare in Venezuela significantly improved under Chavez. In the
1999 constitution, Venezuela declared health to be considered a fundamental right, the
state’s duty is to create and manage a universal public health care system providing free
health services, and it is to be paid for through taxes, social security payments, and oil
revenues (Muntaner et al 2006, 806). In response to that constitutional mandate, Chavez
recruited 10,000 Cuban doctors to provide primary healthcare in poor communities (in
return, Cuba received subsidized oil exports). The program was called Barrio Adentro.
To ensure the Cuban doctors were accessible, they lived in the same communities in
which they provided healthcare (Haggard and Kaufman 2008, 276).
Barrio Adentro was not well received by the upper and upper-middle class in
Venezuela. In 2003 there was an attempted military coup and in 2004 there was a
presidential recall referendum. Both were unsuccessful but were at least partially fueled
by Chavez’s new health program (Muntaner et al 2006, 808). The mobilization of the
poor and working classes, as well as their overwhelming support for their president
helped to ensure Chavez stayed in power. The Barrio Adentro program has been
successful in providing health benefits to the entire population. As such, in the 2005
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Latinobarometer survey, Venezuelan citizens voiced satisfaction with their access to
health care.10
In addition to increases in health access to the poor, Chavez instituted two new
educational social programs in Venezuela. The first, Mision Robinson, taught reading,
writing, and mathematics skills to illiterate adults in Venezuela. Venezuela also instituted
Mision Ribas which sought to educate former high school drop-outs and help them obtain
their high school diploma. The government even provided cash stipends to individuals in
the program as an incentive to complete their degree. Most of the funding for these
programs came from oil revenues and were not funded through general government
expenditures (Penfold-Becerra 2006).
Venezuela’s focus on education has produced tangible results. The total adult
literacy rate in 1990 was 89.8%, and in 2007 it was 95.2% (UNESCO 2011A). The
Education for All Development Index (EDI) is a composite index designed to measure a
country’s education system in relation to four main goals: universal primary education,
adult literacy, gender parity and equality, and the percentage of students who remain
enrolled until the 5th grade. From 1999 to 2007, Venezuela increased their EDI from .910
to .956, an increase of 4.6% (UNESCO 2011B). Interestingly, in 2008, Venezuela’s EDI
dropped to .919, due mainly to a significant drop in the percentage of students who make
it to 5th grade (a decrease of 13.8% in one year).11 Overall, in the 2005 Latinobarometer,
the Venezuelans surveyed were overall satisfied with their access to education.12

10

The average score for Venezuelans, when asked how satisfied they were with their access to healthcare,
was 2.89 out of 4.
11
This would be interesting to investigate what occurred in Venezuela in 2007 and 2008 that created this
large decrease, however, it is outside the scope of the current work.
12
The average score for Venezuelan’s when asked how satisfied they were with their access to education
was 3.00 out of 4.
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Although Chavez’s social programs have produced tangible results, some scholars
believe these programs are being used for clientelistic purposes (Penfold-Becerra 2006,
67). If Chavez is providing social services in return for votes, he has at least been
successful in providing programs that benefit the population. This is reflected in their
higher aggregate satisfaction with access to both healthcare and education. This in turn
appears to have bolstered their satisfaction with Venezuela’s democracy in Venezuela.
Ecuador
Ecuador’s history with social programs is one of minor reforms and low
population coverage. In terms of health and education, Ecuador ranks among the lowest
in the world when comparing public expenditures as a portion of GDP (Georgieva et al
2009, 148). Their satisfaction with democracy aggregate score from the 2005
Latinobarometer survey was also the lowest of the three countries analyzed (the
aggregate score was 1.94 – a little less than “not very satisfied”). Poverty rates are high in
the country, especially among the indigenous and rural populations. However, in the
recent past, the Ecuadoran government has accepted its responsibility to its citizens and
has begun implementing policies and programs to help reduce the incidence of poverty
and increase health and education expenditures.
Of all Latin American countries, Ecuador spends the least on social programs. In
terms of percentage spent of GDP, they are nearly a full percentage point below the next
lowest country (the Dominican Republic). In total, their general government expenditures
for social programs were only 6.24%. Of that, education is the largest social program
with expenditures of 2.54% of GDP. It is followed by social security (2.29%), health
(1.18%), and housing (0.23%).
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Ecuador’s social security system (covering old-age, disability, survivor pensions,
maternity/sickness, and occupational accidents) has evolved into a system that is
stratified along occupational lines and has not experienced a major reform since its
inception. It is administered by the Instituto Ecuatoriano de Seguridad Social (IESS).
This institution has historically been mismanaged: experiencing fraud, massive
overstaffing (leading to high administrative costs), and low investment returns (Lo Vuolo
and Mesa-Lago 1998, 311). Additionally, the fund has historically had issues receiving
contributions to the program, resulting in low coverage of the target population. Recent
estimates indicate that of the economically active population, only 23% contribute
premiums to the program. This contributes to a meager 11% of the population over 65
that acquire the right to a pension (Global Extension of Social Security).
Recently, Ecuador instituted a new program (Bono Solidario) that is operated by
the Ministry of Social Welfare and is outside the normal social security system.
Beginning in September 1998, with an unspecified termination date, the intended
beneficiaries include: poor mothers without a fixed income and at least one child under
18 years of age, elderly individuals over 65 who do not have a fixed wage, and disabled
individuals. At the onset of the program, an additional eligibility requirement for the first
two beneficiary groups was that they must have incomes less than 1 million sucres per
month (approximately $40 a month in United States dollars). In 2003, Bono Solidario
covered approximately 45% of the total households in Ecuador (Velasquez Pinto 2003,
4).
Bono Solidario is not without its own problems. At its inception, eligible mother’s
received the equivalent of US $15.10 and the eligible elderly received US $7.60 per
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month. Just three years later, the purchasing power reduced drastically. Eligible mothers
received $11.50 per month and the elderly received $7 per month (after Ecuador switched
from the Sucre to the United States dollar as the official currency). This represented a
24% and 8% reduction, respectively (Velasquez Pinto 2003, 4). There are also eligibility
problems that plague the system. In 1999, 63% of the benefit recipients in the Bono
Solidario program were ineligible, and should not have received assistance. Of the
individuals not receiving benefits, approximately 38% were eligible to do so (Velasquez
Pinto 2003, 7). The goal to reduce poverty in Ecuador is commendable; however, Bono
Solidario is in definite need of improvement.
Healthcare in Ecuador is provided both by public and private institutions. Public
provision of health services is provided by the Ministry of Public Health (MPH) and the
IESS. The MPH has health posts and administrative offices in each province. IESS
provides coverage to about 10% of the population (28% of the economically active
population), largely benefitting urban workers (Pan-American health Organization 2001).
Although the constitution of Ecuador guarantees the promotion and protection of
the health for all people, approximately 25% of the population lacks regular access to
health services and more than two-thirds do not have health insurance (Pan-American
Health Organization). Furthermore, in the 2005-2006 Life Conditions Survey, only 34%
of the women surveyed knew of their entitlements under the maternity and infant health
program (Garcia, Larrea, and Enriquez 2007, 24). Some attribute the low coverage rates
of the healthcare system in Ecuador to cultural, language, and/or geographic obstacles
that affect the large indigenous population in the country (Georgieva et al 2009, 165).
Based on all of this, it should not be surprising that when asked how satisfied they are

48

with their access to healthcare, the average Ecuadoran response in the 2005
Latinobarometer survey was “not very satisfied.”13
Education policy suffers from many similar pitfalls of other social programs in the
country – equality issues and poor results plague the system. Education accounts for the
largest portion of Ecuador’s social spending but is still low compared to other Latin
American countries. Additionally, discrepancies between rural and urban education, as
well as poor educational outcomes have left many Ecuadoran’s undereducated.
Since 1980, Ecuador has gradually decreased funding to education. The amount
spent in 2003 was 40% below what was spent in 1980, in inflation adjusted units. A
portion of this decrease could be due to the government’s transition from focusing less on
universal social services and more toward targeted social protection programs (such as
Bono Solidario). However, this decline was noted even before targeted programs were
implemented (Vos and Ponce 2004, 5-6).
In addition to decreases in education spending, outcomes in Ecuador are also
bleak. Rural children receive, on average, 4.9 years of schooling. This is compared to 8.7
years for urban youths. For their time spent in school, students are on average deficient in
language and mathematics (standardized tests indicate the average student would obtain a
failing grade on each test) (Vos and Ponce 2004, 4). Illiteracy rates for the indigenous
population are staggering as well. In 2001, 28.2% of the indigenous population over 25
years of age is illiterate. Furthermore, only 22.7% of indigenous youth attended
secondary school, compared to the national average of 44.7% (Vos and Ponce 2004, 3).
Some attribute this to the lack of bilingual education facilities that teach both in Spanish
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The average score for an Ecuadoran when asked how satisfied they were with their access to healthcare
was 2.18 out of 4.
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and their native language (although the number of these schools is increasing). However,
these schools have begun to be thought of as “second-class” schools even by indigenous
group leaders (Martinez-Nova 2009). Not surprisingly, in the 2005 Latinobarometer
survey, the Ecuadorans surveyed expressed, on average, they were not very satisfied with
their access to education.14
The news is not entirely bad for Ecuador, however. The government realizes the
need to increase social spending, especially educational expenditures. Beginning in 2006,
an annual increase in the education budget in the amount of 0.5% of GDP will be
mandatory until budgeted expenditures reach 6% of total annual GDP. A similar policy is
in place for health, with a ceiling of 4% (Georgieva et al. 2009, 148). The most recent
adult literacy rate in the country is 84%; however, this is an increase from 56% in 1950
(UNESCO 2011B; Georgieva et al 2009, 143). Additionally, the 2008 constitution of
Ecuador states education is to be free and mandatory until the end of high school (or
equivalent level). It may take many years for these policies to impact the citizens of
Ecuador; however, the government has identified and begun to respond to the needs of its
populace.
Analysis
As summarized in Table 4.1, social spending in the three countries analyzed
appears to have little effect on aggregate satisfaction with democracy. Brazil spent much
more on social programs than Venezuela and Ecuador. Interestingly, Brazil spent more
on social security in 2005 than Venezuela and Ecuador spent on all their social programs.
The caveat here is that Venezuela’s spending could be understated as they funnel profits
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The average score for an Ecuadoran when asked how satisfied they were with their access to education
was 2.19 out of 4.
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from their oil sales toward some of their social programs (especially the various mision
programs).
Table 4.1 - Aggregate Satisfaction with Democracy and Social Spending – 2005

Country
Venezuela
Brazil
Ecuador

Aggregate
Satisfaction
with Democracy

Social Security
Spending

Education
Spending

Health
Spending

Housing
Spending

2.72
1.97
1.94

3.91
12.28
2.29

4.64
4.55
2.54

1.63
4.32
1.18

1.33
1.37
0.23

Note: 2005 social spending figures reported as a percentage of GDP
Source: 2005 Latinobarometer; CEPAL

What appears to be much more influential in determining aggregate satisfaction of
democracy in Venezuela, Brazil, and Ecuador is the satisfaction with access to education
and healthcare. Table 4.2 provides a summary of these figures. Based on this information,
it appears the citizens in these three countries are taking social policy considerations into
account when evaluating their satisfaction with democracy. However, their attitudes are
not shaped by spending, but on their personal experiences with social programs.
Table 4.2 - Aggregate Satisfaction with Democracy and Satisfaction with Access to
Education and Healthcare

Country

Aggregate
Satisfaction
with Democracy

Aggregate
Satisfaction Education

Aggregate
Satisfaction Healthcare

2.72
1.97
1.94

3.00
2.42
2.19

2.89
2.18
2.18

Venezuela
Brazil
Ecuador
Source: 2005 Latinobarometer
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These findings should not be surprising after considering the quality and coverage
of social programs (or lack thereof). Perhaps more important than having spent the least
of any other country in Latin America in 2005 on social programs, Ecuador still struggles
to provide equal access to education and healthcare. Both Brazil and Ecuador continue to
struggle with targeting social programs toward the poorest segment of the population.
Perhaps Brazil is the most interesting country in the case study. They have a
social security system that favors public employees much more than those working in the
private sector and a healthcare system struggling to provide services to the population
(especially in small towns and rural areas). However, they have an educational system
that is considered a model of education reform that other countries should attempt to
emulate. The population of Brazil appears to be aware of the differences in quality as
their aggregate satisfaction with access to healthcare is much less than their satisfaction
with access to education. It is difficult to tell in this small case study if satisfaction with
access to education does little to increase satisfaction with democracy (which is fairly
low), or if the low level of satisfaction with access to healthcare trumps education and is
keeping their satisfaction with democracy score down.
The case of Ecuador clearly indicates that poor social policies/programs can result
in low levels of satisfaction with democracy. Under the time period studied, the country
began to turn away from universal programs to a more targeted approach to social policy.
The main program, Bono Solidario, suffers benefit allocation problems. Many who are
eligible to receive the benefit do not and many who do are not actually eligible.
Fortunately, Ecuador realizes there are problems with their social programs, particularly
health and education, and are currently taking steps to alleviate access to quality
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healthcare and education. It will be interesting how effective these programs will be and
if satisfaction with democracy will rise due to it. Although if anything can be learned
from this case study, providing more money for social programs only works if that
money directly helps the people.
Interestingly, although Venezuela is considered one of the least democratic
countries in Latin America (Polity IV) they have a very high level of aggregate
satisfaction with democracy. The misiones programs implemented by President Chavez
have had a significant impact on those with the lowest incomes. Most of the citizens in
Venezuela are now able to read and many are going back to complete their secondary
education. However, one should not overlook Venezuela’s oil revenues and the
opportunities available because of it. Most nations in Latin America are not as able to
freely spend as Venezuela.
The relationship between social policy/programs and clientelism is worth further
consideration. Penfold-Becerra (2006) suggested President Chavez has used social
programs in Venezuela as a method of vote-buying and to strengthen his support from the
poorer populations. Weyland (1999) argued that populist leaders in Latin America draw
their support from the unorganized sectors (namely the urban informal sector workers and
rural poor) and attempt to integrate those populations into politics. No doubt Chavez has
done that in Venezuela through the misiones programs. But, while doing that he has also
provided the disenfranchised with many opportunities they otherwise would not have
had.
It is hard to dismiss Chavez’s social policies solely as the “vote-buying”
machinations of a populist leader. Obviously the programs he is providing are resonating
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with the populace as they have one of the highest satisfaction with democracy scores in
the region. Additionally, at what point do social programs become clientelistic endeavors.
Comparing Brazil and Venezuela, the former enacts successful educational reform and is
hailed as a model for the international community to follow. The latter enacts programs
to increase literacy and education levels and is criticized for clientelism. No definitive
conclusions can be drawn from this analysis, but it is an interesting topic for further
research.
Overall, this case study found that citizen’s satisfaction with democracy is not
influenced directly by the level of social spending. What is important is how well the
country provides the populace access to social programs. Only satisfaction with access to
education and healthcare were measured in the 2005 Latinobarometer. Because education
and healthcare policies affect close to the entire population, this seems intuitive that both
programs would have an influence. It is unclear if this relationship would continue to
hold for access to social security or housing programs, which directly affect a much
smaller percentage of the populace.
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Chapter 5: Social Spending and Satisfaction with Democracy:
A Quantitative View
This chapter provides a more comprehensive examination of social spending and
satisfaction with democracy than the case studies in Chapter 4. Additionally, the use of a
hierarchical/mixed model is employed to avoid committing the ecological fallacy (as well
as to test the conclusions from the case studies). First, some descriptive statistics are
provided, along with graphs of the bivariate relationships between different social
spending areas and satisfaction with democracy. Then, the hierarchical model is
introduced and the results are analyzed.
Table 5.1 provides the average satisfaction with democracy “score” for each
country, as well as their social spending in 2005. The results are straightforward, except
that most Latin American countries prioritize their social spending by devoting the most
resources to social security; followed by education, health, and then housing. The major
exception to this rule is Nicaragua and Honduras who spend very little (if anything) on
social security-type expenditures.
Figures 7.1-7.4 (located in the appendix) indicate the bivariate relationships
between 2005 social spending categories and aggregated satisfaction with democracy, in
general, appears to have a positive relationship. This holds for all classifications of social
expenditure except education spending. These are provided for reference only and are to
aid in the generation of hypotheses (that increased levels of social spending will increase
citizens’ satisfaction with democracy).
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Table 5.1 - Aggregate Satisfaction with Democracy and Social Spending in Latin
America

Country
Uruguay
Venezuela
Dominican Republic
Chile
Costa Rica
El Salvador
Argentina
Colombia
Guatemala
Honduras
Bolivia
Panama
Mexico
Brazil
Ecuador
Nicaragua
Peru
Paraguay

Aggregate
Satisfaction
with Democracy

Social
1
Security

Education

Health

Housing

2.75
2.72
2.45
2.41
2.40
2.30
2.23
2.20
2.20
2.18
2.06
2.04
1.99
1.97
1.94
1.90
1.87
1.70

11.70
3.91
2.16
6.43
5.27
2.60
9.15
6.82
1.07
0.27
4.90
1.06
2.11
12.28
2.29
0.00
4.46
2.59

3.34
4.64
2.02
3.39
5.38
3.20
4.77
3.16
2.94
7.58
6.50
3.81
3.84
4.55
2.54
4.86
2.89
3.94

3.30
1.63
1.36
2.79
4.88
3.58
4.60
1.93
1.17
3.42
3.47
1.97
2.67
4.32
1.18
3.46
1.34
1.44

1.35
1.33
1.62
0.27
1.74
2.20
1.61
0.91
2.41
0.13
2.09
0.69
1.77
1.37
0.23
2.85
0.48
0.15

1

1

1

1 - Social program expenditure figures are presented as a percentage of the country's GDP
Source: Satisfaction with Democracy - 2005 Latinobarometer Survey; Social Spending Data - CEPAL

The final regression model estimated is an intercept-only model. There is no
assumption or theoretical basis to assume any of our level-2 (country) variables will
interact with, or influence, the level-1 (individual) variables. The model specified
introduces a random intercept model. This allows for an emphasis of the effect of the
level-2 variables on the dependent variable (Luke 2004, 13). It also assumes that countryeffects are random and that the effects of the social spending are random and differs
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between countries. This is appropriate because of the interest in social spendings' effect
on satisfaction with democracy. Table 5.2 provides the results from the final model.15
Because of the difficulty interpreting the coefficients of a logistic regression model, odds
ratios have also been included. These indicate the percentage chance of an increase or
decrease in the dependent variable given a change of one unit in the independent variable.
The likelihood-ratio test indicates, with a high degree of significance, that the
hierarchical model specified has more explanatory power than the single-level model. In
itself, this a large finding as many previous studies examining citizen’s satisfaction with
democracy either utilized individual-level data or aggregated survey results and examined
satisfaction at the country-level. Including country-level predictors in determining
individual’s satisfaction with democracy is appropriate and beneficial.
From Table 5.2, the thresholds indicate the markers of the underlying latent
variable16 that are used to distinguish the ordinal measures of satisfaction with
democracy. As an example, “Threshold2” indicates the point that distinguishes “not
satisfied” responses from “not very satisfied” when all the independent variables are held
at 0. Likewise, “Threshold3” is the point where “somewhat satisfied” and “very satisfied”
is delineated, etc.
Not surprisingly, national and personal economic evaluations are highly
significant predictors of satisfaction with democracy. Referencing the odds ratios, it
appears an increase of one (from “not satisfied” to “not very satisfied,” “somewhat
satisfied” to “satisfied,” etc) in a respondent’s national economic evaluation would
increase the likelihood of a higher satisfaction with democracy score by 33%. There is
15

See the appendix for diagnostic tests of the model
The latent variable, in this case, is a continuous, unmeasured variable which determines the actual value
of the observed satisfaction with democracy variable.

16
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Table 5.2 – Hierarchical Ordered Logistic Regression Results

Coefficient

Std Error

Odds Ratio

Threshold2

2.3486 ***

0.0251

---

Threshold3

4.4267 ***

0.0396

---

Satisfaction with Access to Healthcare

0.1825 ***

0.0215

1.1668

Satisfaction with Access to Education

0.1861 ***

0.0215

1.1698

National Economic Evaluation

0.3933 ***

0.0168

1.3251

Personal Economic Evaluation

0.1893 ***

0.0181

1.1725

Some or Completed Primary School

-0.0922

0.0603

0.9034

Some or Completed Technical School

-0.2323 ***

0.0639

0.7385

Some or Completed Secondary School

-0.4626 ***

0.0735

0.4118

Age 16-25

-0.2037 **

0.0679

0.7741

Age 26-40

-0.0832

0.0629

0.9132

Age 41-60

-0.0917

0.0605

0.9040

Employed

0.1402 *

0.0612

1.1308

Retired

0.2067 *

0.0915

1.1867

Homemaker

0.1801 **

0.0674

1.1648

Student

0.1107

0.0836

1.1048

Health and Education Spending

-0.0248

0.1514

0.9749

Social Security Spending

0.0453

0.0437

1.0443

Housing Spending

0.2164

0.1956

1.1946

Intermediate Implementer

-0.1649

0.2989

0.8207

Polity IV Score

-0.0851

0.1372

0.9112

Infant Mortality Rate

-0.0313

0.0175

0.9682

Level-1 (Individual) Variables

Level-2 (Country) Variables

*** p < .001; ** p < .01; * p < .05
N (Individuals)
N (Countries)

17772
18

Log-Likelihood
Likelihood-Ratio Test
p-value

8457.70
1204.03
0.0000

also a 17% chance a one unit increase in personal economic evaluations would increase
the respondent’s level of satisfaction with democracy. This relationship is predicted based
on past research (Anderson and Guillory 1997).
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The more surprising finding is that an individual’s satisfaction with their access to
education and healthcare are just as important as personal economic evaluations.
Increasing an individual’s satisfaction with their access to healthcare and education by
one level would increase the likelihood of a higher level of satisfaction with democracy
by 17% each. This indicates that social policy decisions, implementation, and access of
the programs (at least for education and healthcare) significantly impact satisfaction with
democracy.
Nevertheless, country-level spending on education and health, social security, and
housing programs are not significant predictors of satisfaction with democracy. The lack
of a significant relationship between level of social spending and satisfaction with
democracy should not be a major cause for concern. This finding suggests that after
adjusting for inflation for the level-1 covariates, citizens are not concerned with (or
aware) how much a government spends on such programs; rather, individuals are more
cognizant how social policy affects them. This is very intuitive. At the onset of the
project, country-level social spending indicators were utilized because it was thought that
these could be seen as proxies for the quality of social programs. Based on past research,
it is obvious that some country’s social spending is wasted on corruption,
mismanagement, overstaffing, and/or inadequate facilities (Lewis and Medici 1998; Lo
Vuolo and Mesa-Lago 1998; Velasquez Pinto 2003).
Still, there could be a question whether social spending (particularly health and
education spending) could impact a citizen’s satisfaction with access to health and
education, which in turn predicts their satisfaction with democracy. If this relationship
were found, perhaps a two-stage least squares model would be more appropriate than a
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Table 5.3 – Hierarchical Ordered Logistic Regression – Satisfaction with Access to
Healthcare
Coefficient

Std Error

Odds Ratio

Threshold2

2.8196 ***

0.0351

---

Threshold3

5.2079 ***

0.0472

---

Satisfaction with Access to Education

1.8332 ***

0.0231

1.8401

National Economic Evaluation

0.0637 ***

0.0171

1.0617

Personal Economic Evaluation

0.1496 ***

0.0187

1.1390

Some or Completed Primary School

-0.0345

0.0625

0.9649

Some or Completed Technical School

-0.0729

0.0660

0.9244

Some or Completed Secondary School

-0.2221 **

0.0759

0.7512

Age 16-25

0.0227

0.0703

1.0225

Age 26-40

-0.1018

0.0650

0.8928

Age 41-60

-0.0561

0.0625

0.9423

Employed

0.0923

0.0630

1.0882

Retired

0.2884 **

0.0948

1.2505

Homemaker

0.1337

0.0695

1.1251

Student

-0.0456

0.0862

0.9533

0.0932

0.0709

1.0890

Level-1 (Individual) Variables

Level-2 (Country) Variables
Health Spending
*** p < .001; ** p < .01; * p < .05
N (Individuals)
N (Countries)

17772
18

hierarchical linear model. As noted in Tables 5.3 and 5.4 (the regressions were completed
with the same assumptions as the regression model at Table 5.2), health and education
spending are not significant predictors of satisfaction with access to healthcare and
education, respectively. This would imply that social spending has very little impact on a
citizen’s satisfaction with democracy. More important is a citizen’s opinion of their
access to healthcare and education.
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Table 5.4 – Hierarchical Ordered Logistic Regression – Satisfaction with Access to
Education
Coefficient

Std Error

Odds Ratio

Threshold2

2.6156 ***

0.0034

---

Threshold3

5.2001 ***

0.0471

---

Satisfaction with Access to Healthcare

1.8359 ***

0.0231

1.8405

National Economic Evaluation

0.0922 ***

0.0170

1.0881

Personal Economic Evaluation

0.0938 ***

0.0186

1.0896

Some or Completed Primary School

0.1208

0.0621

1.1138

Some or Completed Technical School

0.1575 *

0.0656

1.1457

Some or Completed Secondary School

0.4460 ***

0.0757

1.3598

Age 16-25

0.1502 *

0.0700

1.1394

Age 26-40

0.2229 ***

0.0648

1.1998

Age 41-60

0.1201

0.0624

1.1132

Employed

0.0317

0.0630

1.0312

Retired

-0.1290

0.0944

0.8624

Homemaker

0.0111

0.0694

1.0111

Student

0.3292 ***

0.0864

1.2805

-0.0021

0.0514

0.9979

Level-1 (Individual) Variables

Level-2 (Country) Variables
Education Spending
*** p < .001; ** p < .01; * p < .05
N (Individuals)
N (Countries)

17772
18

The final social policy variables included in the model indicate that it does not
matter when countries implemented social security programs (the precursor to the other
social programs in Latin America). This suggests a country’s history with social policy
does not affect their citizen’s evaluations of satisfaction with democracy. This is good
news to countries that did not begin to enact social programs until fairly recently. As long
as those programs are directed at and benefit the citizens, increases in satisfaction with
democracy are possible.
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The control variables also indicate some interesting trends in predicting
satisfaction with democracy. The coefficients for levels of education appear to be a
significant predictor of satisfaction with democracy. Those who attended or completed
technical school were 26% more likely to report lower satisfaction with democracy
scores. Citizens who attended or completed secondary school were approximately 59%
more likely to report lower satisfaction with democracy. Both these findings are highly
significant. Although the coefficient for individuals who attended or completed primary
school (a dummy variable) is not significant in the model, the results indicate that higher
levels of education are more likely to lead to lower levels of satisfaction with democracy.
It appears individuals with greater levels of education (at least attaining enrollment in
technical schools) are more likely to demand more from their democracies. Education
allows citizens to diagnose their society’s ills and determine if the government is taking
appropriate action (in this case, citizens are saying their democracies are not fulfilling the
people’s needs in the country).
A similar finding is noted with the age of the respondent. Compared to the
reference group (people over 61 years of age), individuals who are between the ages of
16 and 25 are 23% more likely to express a lower level of satisfaction. In many Latin
American countries, democracies are relatively new. However, this age group would have
most likely only known democracy. Purely speculative, 16-25 year-olds could see what
democracy has not been able to provide the country, while older generations could have
seen the alternative and prefer the democratic process.
Employment status also seems to have a predictive effect on satisfaction with
democracy. Contrary to the findings of Carlin (2006) who found higher unemployment in
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a country led to higher levels of satisfaction with democracy, the employed were 13%
more likely to express a higher level of satisfaction than the unemployed and other
classifications of workers. Similarly, those individuals who have retired were 19% more
likely to report higher levels of satisfaction with democracy than other employment
groups. Interestingly, homemakers (individuals whose primary responsibility is for
household duties) are nearly 17% more likely to report a higher level of satisfaction than
the other classifications of workers.
The control for level of democracy in a given country does not affect a citizen’s
satisfaction with democracy. This would signify that citizens’ satisfaction levels are not
reflective of the level of development of a democracy. The proxy measure for overall
level of development (the infant mortality rate) is not significant as well. However, it is
significant at the .10 level and is the closest level-2 variable to obtain statistical
significance.
These results indicate that Latin Americans take many things into account when
determining their level of satisfaction with democracy. Like previous research focusing
on European countries, economic evaluations (both personal and national) were
significant predictors of satisfaction with democracy. Surprisingly, just as influential was
an individual’s satisfaction with their access to healthcare and education. The fact that
this was significant, but a country’s health and education spending were not significant,
indicates that Latin Americans are not influenced by government spending but are
concerned about the quality and access of health and education facilities.
It is clear that social policy considerations are taken into account when an
individual assesses their level of satisfaction with democracy. These findings should be
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of interest to Latin American countries that suffer from low satisfaction levels among
their populace. Increasing the access of social programs to their citizens would likely
increase the overall satisfaction with democracy in the country and could lead to a
stronger commitment to democracy on behalf of the citizens.

64

Chapter 6: Conclusion
Previous research analyzing social policy in Latin America focused on the
evolution of the policies in given countries. Of interest were the conditions that lead to
the organization and administration of social programs. Very little research has analyzed
the impact social policy has had on Latin Americans living under these policies. This
thesis provided the first step in closing that gap in research by looking at how social
spending impacts satisfaction with democracy.
Ultimately, the case studies of Brazil, Ecuador, and Venezuela found little
correlation between the amount a country spent on social programs in 2005 and their
aggregate satisfaction with democracy. Brazil spent the most of any Latin American
country on social programs; however, their satisfaction with democracy score was barely
above that of Ecuador. Of all the Latin American countries analyzed, Ecuador spent the
least. The mid-level social spender, Venezuela, had a very high level of aggregate
satisfaction with democracy in 2005. However, Venezuela’s social spending percentages
could be understated due to the diversion of oil revenues from the state-owned oil
company toward social programs.
While aggregate satisfaction with democracy did not appear to be affected by
level of social spending in the three countries examined, a citizen’s satisfaction with their
access to healthcare and education appeared to be associated with satisfaction with
democracy. Unfortunately, it was impossible to tell if education or healthcare was the
most important program. Brazil was the only country which had a sizeable difference
between citizen’s satisfaction with access to healthcare and education, but that one case
was difficult to conclude on.
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Ecuador, with their low-levels of satisfaction with democracy and minimal
satisfaction with access to healthcare and education, has determined to increase social
spending in these two areas. The increases were not scheduled to take effect until 2006. It
will be of interest to see how those funding increases will affect satisfaction with
democracy (if at all). As noted previously, if increased spending is not directed toward
the people there is little hope for improved results.
Because of the limited size of the case study and the related difficulty in
generalizing the findings to all Latin American countries, a region-wide analysis was
completed utilizing a hierarchical linear model. Again, 2005 Latinobarometer survey data
was utilized to determine the effect of social spending on satisfaction with democracy.
The hierarchical linear model allowed for analysis at two levels – the first for citizenlevel attitudes and the second for country-level social spending figures.
Similar to the case study, social expenditures appear to have little impact on
citizens’ satisfaction with democracy. However, an individual’s satisfaction with access
to healthcare and education were highly significant predictors of satisfaction with
democracy. The effect of satisfaction with access to healthcare and education was similar
to a previously discovered predictor of satisfaction with democracy – satisfaction with an
individual’s economic situation. This finding suggests that social policy (at least
education and healthcare policy) does matter to Latin Americans when assessing their
level of satisfaction with democracy. Unfortunately, the Latinobarometer did not ask
respondents about their satisfaction with other social programs (i.e. social security or
housing programs).
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Prior satisfaction with democracy literature has not included a measure regarding
the satisfaction with access to healthcare and education. But, as noted from this thesis,
future studies would benefit from its inclusion. Unfortunately, the Latinobarometer
survey does not consistently include these questions.
Other findings from the regression model are summarized at Table 7.1. Similar to
previous research, a citizen’s economic evaluations (both personal and national) were
significant predictors of satisfaction with democracy. Additionally, retirees, homemakers,
and the employed were all more likely to express higher levels of satisfaction with
democracy. However, those between the ages of 16 and 25, as well as the more educated
were more likely to express lower levels of satisfaction.
Figure 6.1 – Predictors of Satisfaction with Democracy

Percentage Change in Odds of Satisfaction with Democracy
National
Economic
Evaluation
Access to Access to
Healthcare Education

Personal
Economic
Evaluation

Employed

Technical
School
Education

Secondary
School
Education

-80

-60

Percentage Change in Odds
-40
-20
0
20

40

Statistically Significant Level-1 Variables
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Age 1625

Retired Homemaker

Social policy in Latin America is very diverse. Some countries have followed
Chile down the path of privatization. Others, like Costa Rica, have chosen to remain
committed to government-provided, universal programs. Some countries expend a large
portion of their GDP on social programs, others relatively little. However, what remains
consistent across Latin America is that satisfactory access to healthcare and education
facilities increases the average Latin American’s satisfaction with democracy. The
importance of increasing satisfaction with democracy in the region is to decrease the
likelihood of a return to authoritarianism because democracy was unable to provide for
the needs of the populace.
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Appendix
Figures 7.1 to 7.4 display the bivariate relationships between social spending
categories and aggregate satisfaction with democracy. In all instances (except education
spending), there appears to be a positive relationship between aggregate satisfaction with
democracy and social spending.

Figure 7.1 – Bivariate Relationship – Satisfaction with Democracy and Education
Spending
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Figure 7.2 – Bivariate Relationship – Satisfaction with Democracy and Health
Spending

Figure 7.3 – Bivariate Relationship – Satisfaction with Democracy and Social
Security Spending
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Figure 7.4 – Bivariate Relationship – Satisfaction with Democracy and Housing
Spending

Regression Diagnostics
According to Luke (2004), the two most important assumptions that can be
checked in a multilevel model is that level-1 errors are independent and normally
distributed (see Figure 7.1) and that the random effects are normally distributed with a
mean of zero and are independent across groups (see Figure 7.2). Based on Figures 7.1
and 7.2, the model specified at Table 5.2 is not violating any of the assumptions of
mixed/hierarchical linear models.
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Figure 7.5 – Kernel Density Estimate of Level 1 Residuals
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Based on Figure 7.1 above, it appears level-1 residuals are normally distributed
and are centered on a mean of 0. This indicates that the Level-1 indicators are not
violating any regression assumptions.
Figure 7.2 is a Q-Q Plot that shows the distance of a country’s empirical Bayes
estimates from the predicted values. To interpret the plot, if the country observations
resemble the 45 degree line, then the random effects are distributed normally.
Fortunately, the observations are close to the 45 degree line. We can assume the random
effects are distributed normally.
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Figure 7.6 – QQ-Plot of Expected Values
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Another valuable insight that can be gleaned from the plot at Figure 7.2 is
whether there are any outliers in the data. Countries significantly above the 45 degree
reference line indicate outlying cases. Fortunately, the model estimated at Table 5.2 does
not appear to have any outlying cases.
It was also found in the original data that multicollinearity was present in several
of the level-2 variables. Table 7.1 shows the original level-2 variables to be included in
the regression equation, as well as the variance inflation factor (VIF) for each variable.
These factors indicate how similar a specific independent variable is to other independent
variables included in the model. As noted, the variance inflation factor for health
spending, education spending, social security spending, and pioneer social security
implementers have very high values. It was quickly discovered that there was a high
degree of multicollinearity between pioneer implementers and social security spending.
The same phenomenon was observed between health and education spending.
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Table 7.1 – Diagnosis of Multicollinearity – Level-2 Variables
Variable
Education Spending
Healthcare Spending
Social Security Spending
Housing Spending
Pioneer Implementer
Intermediate Implementer
Polity IV Score
Infant Mortality Rate
Mean VIF

VIF

Tolerance

3.95
6.02
5.59
2.47
8.07
2.84
1.32
2.28

0.2533
0.1660
0.1790
0.4052
0.1239
0.3521
0.7578
0.4378

4.07

To adjust for the multicollinearity found between the pioneer implementers and
social security spending, the dummy variable for pioneer implementers was dropped from
the model. This variable was not a key variable of interest and according to Acock (2010,
263) dropping an offending variable is not troublesome as most of its explanatory power
is already included in another variable (in this case, the variable for social security
spending).
To adjust for the high degree of multicollinearity found between health and
education spending, a factor score was created for each country. Table 7.2 is the STATA
output indicating eigenvalues and factor loadings of the variables. According to Table
7.2, there appears to be one major factor in the variables reviewed (the four social
spending variables), and it includes only health and education spending. Dropping one of
the variables (either health or education spending) would not have been an ideal solution
as both are key explanatory variables. Creating a scaled score appears to be appropriate in
this instance.
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Table 7.2 – Eigenvalues and Factor Loadings – Social Spending Indicators
Factor
Factor1
Factor2
Factor3
Factor4

Eigenvalue
1.4174
0.5293
0.3078
-0.2717

Variable
Education Spending
Healthcare Spending
Social Security Spending
Housing Spending

Factor

Uniqueness

0.6123
0.8986
0.391
0.2867

0.3990
0.1863
0.4897
0.6703

After dropping the pioneer implementer dummy variable and creating a factor
score for health and education spending, the updated variance inflation factors appear
much more reasonable (see Table 7.3). It does not appear the final model estimated is
suffering from any level-2 multicollinearity.
Table 7.3 – Diagnosis of Multicollinearity after Adjustments
Variable
Health and Education Spending
Social Security Spending
Housing Spending
Intermediate Implementer
Polity IV Score
Infant Mortality Rate
Mean VIF

VIF

Tolerance

1.16
1.30
1.34
1.19
1.23
1.37

0.8647
0.7713
0.7485
0.8393
0.8134
0.7302

1.26

Diagnostics of Multicollinearity for the level-1 variables suggest there could be
some issues in the regression model. The offending variables appear to be control
variables for level of education, age, and employment status (see Table 7.4). However,
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after parsing the diagnostic test into the three categories, it appears any multicollinearity
would be contained within those groups (i.e. any multicollinearity within the education
variables would be found within those same variables). See Tables 7.5 – 7.7 for the VIF
scores of the control variables. Because the VIF scores are not exceptionally high overall,
the mean VIF for all level-1 variables is within tolerable limits, and it would be unclear
which variable(s) to drop, no steps will be taken to reduce multicollinearity in the level-1
variables.
Table 7.4 – Diagnosis of Multicollinearity – Level-1 Variables
Variable

VIF

Tolerance

Satisfaction with Access to Healthcare
Satisfaction with Access to Education
National Economic Evaluation
Personal Economic Evaluation
Some or Completed Primary School
Some or Completed Technical School
Some or Completed Secondary School
Age 16-25
Age 26-40
Age 41-60
Employed
Retired
Homemaker
Student

1.63
1.64
1.18
1.2
3.24
3.32
2.37
3.37
3.5
2.95
4.09
2.19
3.35
2.16

0.6126
0.6083
0.8440
0.8313
0.3085
0.3009
0.4223
0.2970
0.2854
0.3388
0.2447
0.4562
0.2988
0.4622

Mean VIF

2.59
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Table 7.5 – Diagnosis of Multicollinearity – Level-1 Education Variables
Variable

VIF

Tolerance

Some or Completed Primary School
Some or Completed Technical School
Some or Completed Secondary School

3.03
2.95
2.08

0.3304
0.3386
0.4817

Mean VIF

2.69

Table 7.6 – Diagnosis of Multicollinearity – Level-1 Age Variables
Variable
Age 16-25
Age 26-40
Age 41-60
Mean VIF

VIF

Tolerance

2.19
2.39
2.24

0.4571
0.4180
0.4459

2.27

Table 7.7 – Diagnosis of Multicollinearity – Level-1 Employment-Status Variables
Variable
Employed
Retired
Homemaker
Student
Mean VIF

VIF

Tolerance

4.11
1.89
3.36
1.92

0.2436
0.5297
0.2972
0.5213

2.82
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